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Juror Testimony of Racial Bias in Jury Deliberations:
United States v. Benally and the Obstacle of Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b)
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision United States v. Benally,1
the court held that post-verdict juror testimony of racist comments
made by fellow jurors during deliberations is inadmissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) (“Rule 606(b)”).2 According to the
court, Rule 606(b) stands as a nearly insurmountable obstacle to the
admission of any post-verdict juror testimony on statements made
during jury deliberations, regardless of how objectionable or
offensive those statements may be.3 In effect, the jury room is “a
black box: the inputs (evidence and argument) are carefully regulated
by law and the output (the verdict) is publicly announced, but the
inner workings and deliberation of the jury are deliberately insulated
from subsequent review.”4
This Note will explore the Tenth Circuit’s decision United States
v. Benally and argue that the court misapplied Rule 606(b) by
relying on precedent that only tangentially addressed these issues.
Further, this Note will investigate whether the Tenth Circuit, by
holding that juror testimony of racial bias during deliberations is
inadmissible under Rule 606(b), has advanced an interpretation of
Rule 606(b) that potentially conflicts with the criminal defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2007, Defendant Kerry Dean Benally was “charged with
forcibly assaulting a Bureau of Indian Affairs officer with a dangerous
weapon.”5 Prior to his trial, Mr. Benally, a member of the Ute
Mountain Ute tribe, asked several voir dire questions focused on

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1231.
See id. at 1241.
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1231.
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revealing any potential prejudice towards Native Americans.6 Two of
his submissions were used by the court: “‘Would the fact that the
defendant is a Native American affect your evaluation of the case?’
and ‘Have you ever had a negative experience with any individuals of
Native American descent? And, if so, would that experience affect
your evaluation of the facts of this case?’”7 None of those eventually
impaneled as jurors answered affirmatively to these questions.8
On October 10, 2007, Mr. Benally was found guilty of the
charged offense.9 The day after the announcement of the jury
verdict, however, one juror contacted defense counsel and informed
them that “the jury deliberation had been improperly influenced by
racist claims about Native Americans.”10 According to the juror, the
foreman stated that he had personally observed persons on an Indian
Reservation and that “‘[w]hen Indians get alcohol, they all get
drunk,’ and that when they get drunk, they get violent.”11 The juror
further alleged that, although she argued with the foreman, other
jurors appeared to have agreed with the foreman’s racist assertions.12
The juror further alleged that in the course of deliberations some
jurors spoke of the need to “‘send a message back to the
reservation’” that you can’t “‘mess with police officers and get away
with it.’”13
Defense counsel obtained a signed affidavit from the juror and
located one other juror who corroborated some of the first juror’s
allegations.14 Based on the testimony of these two jurors, Mr.
Benally moved for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.15 The trial court granted the motion in light of
the prospect that some jurors had allegedly failed to answer voir dire
questions concerning racial bias truthfully and had considered

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. United States v. Benally, No. 2:07CR256 DAK, 2007 WL 4166135, at *1 (D.
Utah Nov. 20, 2007).
10. Benally, 546 F.3d at 1231.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1231–32.
13. Id. at 1232.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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information not in evidence.16 The trial court noted that although
Rule 606(b) generally forbids a juror from testifying as to the
content of a jury’s deliberations, under the exceptions to the rule, a
juror is allowed to testify “‘whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention, [or]
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon
any juror.’”17
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Rule 606(b)
The primary obstacle to the admission of juror testimony
concerning evidence of racial bias that surfaces during jury
deliberations is Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). Rule 606(b) is
grounded in the “near-universal and firmly established common-law
rule in the United States [that] flatly prohibited the admission of
juror testimony to impeach a jury verdict.”18 At common law,
exceptions to this rule “were recognized only in situations in which
an ‘extraneous influence’ was alleged to have affected the jury.”19
This common law rule, along with its exceptions for evidence of
extraneous influences, was codified in Rule 606(b). This rule
provides that when an inquiry is made into the validity of a verdict, a
juror is incompetent to testify concerning (1) any statement made or
matter occurring during the course of jury deliberations, (2)
anything that had an effect on the juror’s or any other juror’s mind
or emotions as influencing their decision, or (3) anything concerning
“the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith.”20
Prior to the Tenth Circuit decision, there existed a circuit split
between the Ninth and Third Circuits as to the applicability of Rule
606(b) in situations where evidence arises post-verdict that calls into
question the impartiality of the jury. According to the Ninth Circuit,
Supreme Court precedent allows for the introduction of evidence

16. United States v. Benally, No. 2:07CR256 DAK, 2007 WL 4166135, at *2 (D.
Utah Nov. 20, 2007).
17. Id. at *1 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)).
18. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987).
19. Id. (citation omitted).
20. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
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that shows a prospective juror lied during voir dire.21 Consequently,
if a juror was “asked direct questions about racial bias during voir
dire, and . . . swor[e] that racial bias would play no part in his
deliberations, evidence of that juror’s alleged racial bias is
indisputably admissible for the purpose of determining whether the
juror’s responses were truthful.”22 Under the Ninth Circuit view,
such inquiries do not run afoul of Rule 606(b)’s prohibitions on jury
testimony because such inquiries are not challenging the validity of
the jury’s verdict, but whether a juror misled the court by falsely
answering a material question on voir dire.23 If defendants can
demonstrate that a juror “‘failed to answer honestly a material
question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause,’ then
they are entitled to a new trial.”24
The Third Circuit, by contrast, has held that even though
Supreme Court precedent allows for the introduction of evidence
that may show a juror lied during voir dire, such evidence must first
clear the Rule 606(b) hurdle.25 To the Third Circuit, although the
Ninth Circuit depicts its investigation as merely an inquiry into the
truthfulness of a juror’s voir dire responses, the practical effect of
investigating a juror’s voir dire response is actually an indirect
challenge to the validity of the jury verdict.26 Consequently, any
evidence brought forth to support inquiries into the truthfulness of
voir dire responses must first comply with Rule 606(b).27
B. The Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment states that a criminal defendant “shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury . . . .”28 One of the basic requirements of an impartial jury is that
the jurors will only consider the evidence before them and not take

21. See United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121 (2001) (citing McDonough
Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984)).
22. Id. (citing Hard v. Burlington N. R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir. 1987)).
23. See id.
24. Id. (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 464 U.S. at 556).
25. See Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2003).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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into account the defendant’s race or color.29 In situations where a
juror comes forth with evidence of racism during jury deliberations,
the policies and goals of Rule 606(b) and the Sixth Amendment
squarely conflict. On the one hand, Rule 606(b) upholds the
common law’s long-held commitment to the secrecy and
unassailability of juror deliberations.30 On the other hand, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the accused criminal the right to an impartial
tribunal that will decide the case only upon the evidence before it.31
Lower courts have struggled to reconcile these competing values and
“courts faced with the difficult issue of whether to consider evidence
that a criminal defendant was prejudiced by racial bias in the jury
room have hesitated to apply [Rule 606(b)] dogmatically.”32
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether Rule
606(b) wrongfully denies a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury when evidence of racial prejudice in the jury
room is denied admission. The Supreme Court precedent that best
discusses the competing values of Rule 606(b) and the Sixth
Amendment is Tanner v. United States.33 In Tanner, the Court faced
a challenge by the petitioner that the jury in the underlying case was
incompetent because several members allegedly drank alcohol,
smoked marijuana, and ingested cocaine during the course of the
trial.34 The only evidence to support this motion, however, was
testimony by one of the jurors who came forth after the trial and
attested that he had either participated in or witnessed the various
acts of misconduct.35
In a narrow five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that
Rule 606(b) applies in these types of instances and that none of the
exceptions apply because “physical or mental incompetence of a
juror [are treated] as ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ matters.”36 The
Court then turned its attention to the Sixth Amendment, which the
Court has recognized as granting the defendant “a right to a tribunal
29. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008)
(discussing how Rule 606(b) incorporates the “firmly established common-law rule”).
31. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (noting that the right to an
impartial jury requires that a “verdict . . . be based upon the evidence developed at the trial”).
32. Wright v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
33. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
34. Id. at 115–16.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 118.
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both impartial and mentally competent to afford a hearing.”37 The
Court found that although application of Rule 606(b) in these
circumstances forecloses any opportunity to further investigate the
incompetency of the jury, this obstacle, in and of itself, did not
create a constitutional violation.38 To the Court, the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a competent jury was substantially
protected by processes already in place at the trial level: voir dire can
test a candidate’s suitability; the court, counsel, and court personnel
can observe jury members; other jurors can observe their fellow
jurors and can report any misconduct to the court “before they
render a verdict;” and non-juror evidence can be admitted to
challenge the competency of the jury after the verdict.39 Because of
these substantial protections already in place, coupled with the
“long-recognized and very substantial concerns support[ing] the
protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry,” the Court
rejected the Sixth Amendment challenges to Rule 606(b) and found
that the right to a competent jury was already substantially protected
by the trial process and procedures.40
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
At the Tenth Circuit, the court reversed the district court’s grant
of a new trial.41 According to the Tenth Circuit, the trial court
should have denied the motion because the only evidence offered in
its support was juror testimony specifically proscribed by Rule
606(b).42
The Tenth Circuit stated that although Rule 606(b) is an
evidentiary rule, “its role in the criminal justice process is substantive:
it insulates the deliberations of the jury from subsequent secondguessing by the judiciary.”43 Although the trial judge can
meticulously regulate the evidence admitted before the jury in open
court, the jury room is a “black box,” deliberately sealed against
further judicial oversight.44 In short, “[j]uries provide no reasons,
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

242

Id. at 126 (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).
See id. at 126–27.
Id. at 127.
Id.
United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 1233.
Id.
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only verdicts.”45
A. Should Rule 606(b) Apply?
The first issue faced by the Tenth Circuit was whether Rule
606(b) should apply to the Benally circumstances. As mentioned
previously, prior to the Tenth Circuit decision there existed a split
between the Ninth and Third Circuits on whether Rule 606(b)
proscribes admission of juror testimony that is used to challenge the
truthfulness of another juror’s voir dire responses. In reviewing the
Ninth Circuit precedents described above, the Tenth Circuit found it
difficult to accept the proposition that inquiries into the truthfulness
of voir dire responses were not simply disguised inquiries into the
validity of the jury’s verdict.46 As the court explained,
[a]lthough the immediate purpose of introducing the testimony
may have been to show that the two jurors failed to answer
honestly during voir dire, the sole point of this showing was to
support a motion to vacate the verdict, and for a new trial. That is a
challenge to the validity of the verdict.47

Based on this reasoning, the Tenth Circuit rejected the Ninth
Circuit’s standard, echoing the claim by the Third Circuit that such a
standard is “plainly too broad.”48 The court reasoned that “allowing
juror testimony through the backdoor of a voir dire challenge risks
swallowing the rule. A broad question during voir dire could then
justify the admission of any number of jury statements . . . .”49
Consequently the Tenth Circuit found that “[t]he Third Circuit’s
approach best comports with Rule 606(b), and we follow it here.”50
B. Do the Exceptions to Rule 606(b) Apply?
Finding that Rule 606(b) applied, the Tenth Circuit turned its
attention to the enumerated exceptions to the rule. Rule 606(b)
contains three exceptions, two of which are relevant to this case: “‘a
juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention, [and]
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 1235.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1236.
Id.
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(2) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror . . . .’”51
The court rejected any assertion that a juror’s internal racial
biases fall within either of these two exceptions.52 To the Tenth
Circuit, these two exceptions only allow for the admission of
statements concerning “extraneous influences.”53 Examples of such
extraneous influences abound, such as “jurors reading news reports
about the case, jurors communicating with third parties, bribes, and
jury tampering.”54 According to the Tenth Circuit, however, internal
biases do not qualify as extraneous influences contemplated by Rule
606(b)’s exceptions. The court feared that interpreting either
exception to instances of racial bias “would unravel the internal/
external distinction and make anything said in jury deliberations
‘extraneous information’ so long as it was inappropriate.”55
C. Is Rule 606(b) Unconstitutional?
The last argument entertained by the Tenth Circuit was Mr.
Benally’s assertion that Rule 606(b) is unconstitutional because it
violates his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.56 Although
the court found this to be his “most powerful argument,” the court
ultimately rejected his assertion.57 The Tenth Circuit found that
“[t]his Court . . . has consistently ‘upheld application of the Rule
606(b) standards of exclusion of jury testimony even in the face of
Sixth Amendment fair jury arguments.’”58 To strengthen this
conclusion, the court turned its attention to the Supreme Court
decision Tanner v. United States.59 The Tenth Circuit noted that
although the trial procedures in Tanner failed to disclose the alleged
juror misconduct during the course of the trial, the Supreme Court
still found that “the Sixth Amendment did not compel an exception
to Rule 606(b) . . . .”60 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that “Tanner

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)).
Id. at 1236–38.
Id. at 1236–37.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1238.
See id. at 1239–41.
Id.
Id. at 1239 (quoting Braley v. Shillinger, 902 F.2d 20, 22 (10th Cir. 1990)).
483 U.S. 107 (1987).
Benally, 546 F.3d at 1240 (citing Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127).
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compel[led] a similar result in this case,” arguing “that the Sixth
Amendment embodies a right to ‘a fair trial but not a perfect one,
for there are no perfect trials.’”61
The Tenth Circuit feared that “once it is held that the rules of
evidence must be subordinated to the need to admit evidence of
Sixth Amendment violations, we do not see how the courts could
stop at the ‘most serious’ such violations.”62 Leery of this result, the
court rejected Mr. Benally’s claims that Rule 606(b) is
unconstitutional as applied and reversed the district court’s motion
granting a new trial.63
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Interplay Between Rule 606(b) and Untruthful
Voir Dire Responses
Although the Tenth Circuit held that Rule 606(b) clearly applies
to circumstances challenging the truthfulness of voir dire responses,
further investigation of the precedent relied upon by the court calls
this conclusion into question. As mentioned previously, a circuit split
existed between the Ninth and Third Circuits on whether Rule
606(b) applies to juror testimony of racist jury deliberations when
the juror was asked direct questions about racial bias during voir
dire. This split actually stems from a 1984 Supreme Court case,
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,64 in which a juror
mistakenly failed to answer truthfully a question on voir dire about
his background.65 The underlying case involved a child who had
been severely injured in an accident and was suing the manufacturer
for damages.66 During voir dire, the plaintiff’s attorney asked
questions aimed at discovering whether any of the prospective jurors,
or any of their immediate family members, had ever been severely
injured in an accident.67 One of those eventually impaneled, who had
a son who had been injured in an accident, failed to respond

61.
(1984)).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553
Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1242.
464 U.S. at 548.
Id. at 549.
Id.
Id. at 549–50.
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affirmatively to these questions because he mistakenly believed they
were inapplicable to him.68 The jury later found for the manufacturer
and the plaintiff moved for a new trial.69
At the Supreme Court, the Court held that “to obtain a new trial
in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed
to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further
show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a
challenge for cause.”70 To demonstrate that the juror failed to
answer truthfully, the plaintiff brought forth a signed affidavit from a
Navy Recruiter who could attest to the fact that the juror’s son had
disclosed on his Navy application that he had been “injured in the
explosion of a truck tire.”71
Because the juror’s failure to answer the voir dire question was
demonstrated through non-juror testimony, McDonough did not
involve circumstances that trigger Rule 606(b). Consequently,
although the standard announced in McDonough is relatively
straightforward, the decision itself is silent as to the appropriate role
of Rule 606(b) in post-verdict challenges of voir dire responses.
With this background in mind, the Third Circuit decision relied
upon by the Tenth Circuit is not so determinative of the issue as the
Tenth Circuit suggests. In Williams, the Third Circuit was asked to
evaluate whether a petitioner was entitled to federal habeas relief
from a state court adjudication.72 Under such circumstances, the
standard of review is whether the state court decision was “‘contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.’”73 Under this strict standard, the Third Circuit was not
evaluating whether challenges to voir dire must comply with the
requirements of Rule 606(b), but whether it was clearly established
that voir dire challenges are beyond the scope of Rule 606(b). As
mentioned previously, the circumstances involved in McDonough in
no way implicated Rule 606(b), and, consequently, the McDonough
decision says nothing about whether voir dire challenges must
comply with Rule 606(b). In light of this context, the Third
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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Id.
Id. at 548–51.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 551.
Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 228–29 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2002) (emphasis removed)).
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Circuit’s decision seems appropriate under a “clearly established”
standard, but ultimately unhelpful to the Benally controversy.
Once the Third Circuit decision is limited to its appropriate
contours, the only circuit to squarely address the issue is the Ninth
Circuit. Under the Ninth Circuit approach, because the jurors were
asked two questions directly aimed at revealing racial prejudice
during voir dire, Rule 606(b) would not be implicated and Benally
could use juror testimony to challenge the truthfulness of the
offending jurors’ responses. Benally would then have an opportunity
to demonstrate that the juror’s failure to respond honestly stripped
him of an opportunity to remove these jurors for cause.
The Tenth Circuit’s most compelling challenge to the Ninth
Circuit approach is its contention that, as the operative effect of a
successful challenge to a voir dire response is to invalidate the jury’s
verdict, the process should be characterized as a challenge to the
validity of the underlying verdict.74 In looking at the operative effect
of other evidence rules, however, the Tenth Circuit’s fears appear to
be overstated. The Rules of Evidence constantly permit evidence to
be admitted for one purpose while forbidding it for others—even
though the practical effect is the same. For example, a statement may
be inadmissible hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter asserted
but may be admissible for some other purpose.75 The practical effect,
however, is that the evidence is admitted to the jury with a limiting
instruction from the judge that the evidence only be considered for
the admissible purpose.
B. Constitutionality of Rule 606(b) as Applied
In finding that Rule 606(b) denies admission of evidence that
challenges the impartiality of the jury, the Tenth Circuit has
advanced an interpretation of Rule 606(b) that potentially conflicts
with the Sixth Amendment. To be fair, the Tenth Circuit considered
this potential constitutional complication and rejected it as being
unsupported by Supreme Court precedent. That being said, the
precedent relied upon by the Tenth Circuit is distinguishable from
Benally in several important respects and fails to fully justify the
Tenth Circuit’s holding.
In rejecting Benally’s assertion that Rule 606(b) is
74. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 2008).
75. See FED. R. EVID. 801.
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unconstitutional, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily upon Tanner v.
United States. Although the Tenth Circuit is correct in finding
Tanner as the closest analog to the Bennally controversy, important
distinctions remain. Perhaps the most intriguing distinction between
Tanner and Benally is that Tanner involved a challenge based on
juror incompetence, while Benally involved a challenge of juror
impartiality. Although it is true that both incompetence and
impartiality are addressed by the Sixth Amendment, the United
States’ complicated history with racial biases and prejudices in the
court room warns against treating the two identically.76 In light of
the fact that the Tanner outcome was so narrow, a challenge to Rule
606(b) under circumstances involving racial prejudice could merit a
different outcome.
The suggestion that a situation involving racial prejudice may
result in a different outcome than Tanner is bolstered by lower court
decisions that have directly considered whether the Sixth
Amendment requires the admission of jury testimony of racial
prejudice. For example, one court stated that “if a criminal defendant
could show that the jury was racially prejudiced, such evidence could
not be ignored without trampling the sixth amendment’s guarantee
to a fair trial and an impartial jury.”77 Or as a court in the Seventh
Circuit explained, “[w]here . . . an offer of proof showed that there
was a substantial likelihood that a criminal defendant was prejudiced
by the influence of racial bias in the jury room, to ignore the
evidence might very well offend fundamental fairness.”78
These suggestions by the lower courts that such situations run
afoul of the Sixth Amendment are bolstered by the fact that the Sixth
Amendment protections cited by the Supreme Court in Tanner fail
to protect against instances of racial prejudice that arise during jury
deliberations. Unlike juror misconduct such as that in Tanner where
the juror’s ingestion of drugs and alcohol could be quite apparent to
a careful observer, a juror’s racial prejudice might not surface until
jury deliberations. “Indeed, that appears to be precisely what
occurred here: despite the district court’s best efforts at protecting
Mr. Benally’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, the jury
foreman clearly lied during the voir dire proceedings about his ability

76. See, e.g., Strauder v. W. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
77. Wright v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
78. Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1978).
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to be impartial.”79
Perhaps the best way to assess whether the Sixth Amendment
requires the allowance of juror testimony in this limited circumstance
is to ask whether admitting this evidence is to “insist on something
closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to
give.”80 Certainly, there are no perfect trials and to insist on such
would jeopardize the viability of the judicial system. But, in instances
such as Benally where alleged juror misconduct rises to the level of
racial prejudice, the Sixth Amendment requirement of an impartial
jury appears to require further investigation. Under these
circumstances, it is not insisting upon perfection to give the trial
court discretion to hold a limited evidentiary hearing to investigate
the matter and decide whether a new trial is warranted.81
VI. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Benally, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
common-law tradition, codified in Rule 606(b), that jury
deliberations should be kept secret except in the most exceptional
circumstances. To the Tenth Circuit, keeping jury deliberations
locked from further review protects the finality of judgments,
encourages open discussion amongst jurors, and instills within jurors
an “urgency that comes from knowing that their decision is the final
word.”82
While Rule 606(b) advances important policy goals, safeguarding
jury decisions based on racial bias or prejudice should not be among
them. In the limited circumstances where a juror comes forth, postverdict, with testimonial evidence of racist jury deliberations, courts
should be allowed to hold a limited evidentiary hearing to investigate
the matter and to determine whether a new trial is warranted.
Brandon C. Pond

79. United States v. Benally, 560 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2009) (Briscoe, J.,
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).
80. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 555 (1984).
81. This is currently the approach taken in the Ninth Circuit. See United States v.
Henley, 238 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2001).
82. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008).
 B.A., University of Utah; J.D. candidate, April 2010, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
Brigham Young University.
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